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Recent Decisions

CONFLICT OF LAWS-STATUTES OF LIMITATION-A Foreign
Statute Of Limitation Possessing Attributes Characterized As Substantive Will Bar An Action At The Forum If Barred By The Otherwise
Applicable Law Of The Foreign Jurisdiction. Ramsay v. Boeing Co.,
432 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1970).
A commercial airliner en route to Brussels from New York crashed
while making its final approach to the Brussels airport, resulting in the
death of the plaintiffs' decedents. Suit was filed in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi against Boeing
Company on the basis of diversity of citizenship.' The petition, instituted
thirteen days before the Mississippi statute of limitations would have
prescribed the action,' was predicated on Belgian law3 and alleged negligent manufacture of the aircraft. Boeing moved to dismiss, contending
the suit was barred by the five-year Belgian statute of limitation. The
district court denied the motion and submitted the case to the jury, which
returned a general verdict for the defendants. The plaintiffs' motion for
a new trial was denied. On appeal, Boeing, by cross points of error,
contended that the trial court erred by not directing a verdict for the defendants because the right and the remedy were barred under Belgian
law. Held, affirmed on different grounds: When a foreign statute of limi-

tations has attributes that the forum would characterize as substantive,
the entire suit is barred at the forum if barred by the otherwise applicable
law of the foreign jurisdiction. Ramsay v. Boeing Co., 432 F.2d 592
(5th Cir. 1970).
Statutes of limitation have long been considered to be matters of
procedure by the great majority of American courts.' The reason given
128 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964). Plaintiffs Alexander and Jean Ramsay were citizens
of Michigan; Genevieve Swallender was a citizen of Minnesota; Martha Offergelt was
a citizen of West Germany; and Helene Balteay was a citizen of Belgium. Defendant
Boeing Company was a Delaware Corporation with its principal place of business in
the state of Washington. Thus a situation of complete diversity of citizenship was presented to the federal court; Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
2
Miss. CODE ANN. § 722 (1956).
3 BELGIUM CIVIL CODE art. 1382 (1970) provides: "Any human act which causes

injury to another, obliges the person whose fault caused the damage to redress it."
BELGIUM CIVIL CODE art. 1383 (1970) provides: "Everyone is liable for the injury

caused not only by his action but also by his negligence or imprudence."
BELGIUM CIVIL CODE art. 1384(1) (1970) provides: "One is responsible not only
for the injury caused by one's own acts, but also for that which is caused by the act
of persons for whom one is responsible, or of things which are in one's control or
custody."
'See, e.g., H. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 85 (4th ed. 1964). See also cases

THE IOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

is that forum procedure is familiar to both the lawyers and the courts;
requiring a judicial system to apply the procedure of other states and
foreign nations imposes an intolerable burden upon them. Such a system actively encourages forum shopping, but the convience of administration clearly outweighs the policy against forum shopping.
Forum procedure has also been justified on the ground that statutes
of limitation, being only statutes of repose and not of cancellation, affect
the "remedy and not the right."' This rule has a dubious historical basis
and has been criticized. One commentator has suggested that the rule
was first delineated by the common law courts, then a justification or
rationalization was contrived for it.' The Second Circuit has stated that
characterization of statutes of limitation as procedural is merely an
"accident of history."' The English common law had been relatively free
from foreign influences, and it was only natural that English judges
would be more inclined to apply "common law" than attempt to discover the "civil law" of a foreign jurisdiction, written in a foreign language Perhaps some justification existed for this characterization during the developmental period of the common law, but today it has been
questioned by many conflict of laws scholars and has been rejected by
some courts."
Another justification for the "right-remedy" distinction is that statutes
of limitation have no extraterritorial effect-law is not binding beyond
the borders of the sovereign who promulgated that law and whose force
stands behind it." Thus, if a state or nation enforces a right created under
collected in 15A C.J.S. Conflict of Laws § 22(5) (1967);53 C.J.S. Limitation of Actions § 27 (1948) and 12 TEX. JUR. 2d Conflict of Laws § 15 (1960).
5 See Lorenzen, Statutes of Limitation and the Conflict of Laws, 28 YALE L. J.

492 (1919); Ailes, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 39 MICH. L. R
REv. 392 (1941).

' Pringle v. Gibson, 135 Me. 297, 195 A. 695 (1938); Louisiana & M. R.R. Transfer Vo. v. Long, 159 Miss. 654, 131 So. 84 (1930); Gautier v. Franklin, I Tex. 732
(1847). See generally G. STUMBERO, PRINCIPLES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws 145-46
(3d ed. 1963).

'See note 10, infra.
8

220 F. 2d 152, 154 (2d Cir. 1955).

' See generally H. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 85 (4th ed. 1964). See also
Lorenzen, Statutes of Limitation and the Conflict of Laws, 28 YALE L. J. 492 (1919)
and Note, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177 (1950).
1°See generally A. DE
CONFLICTS OF LAWS (1966).

CERVERA,

THE STATUTE

OF LIMITATIONS

IN AMERICAN

Most notable among the courts which refuse to follow

this rule are all federal courts sitting in diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. Federal
courts are required to apply the law of the state in which they sit as to matters of
substance, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)

as well as the forum's conflict

of laws rule, Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
Under the theory of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) and Ragan
v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949), such statutes are
considered to be "outcome-determinative" and as such are characterized as substantive
provisions of the state law.
"J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws §5 18, 20 (2d ed. 1841).
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a foreign law, it is because that right has "vested" and all nations have
the obligation, through a theory of comity, to protect vested rights." But
the primary goal in conflict of laws is to establish a system in which the
choice of a forum will not affect the result.1 If this is truly the purpose
of conflict of laws, the "right-remedy" distinction is not conducive to it.
The distinction between right and remedy appears to be based largely on
historical grounds and very little else. As Mr. Justice Holmes stated, "It
is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule
simply persists from blind imitation of the past."'" Moreover, no greater
difficulty exists in the application of a readily discernable statute of limitations than in the application of any of the substantive laws of a foreign
nation. A statute of limitation is not a rule of procedure; it does not
affect the method of the presentation of the suit, but rather determines
whether the injured party shall be allowed the opportunity to offer any
proof whatsoever. Traditional rules of procedure are interrelated and
operate as a cohesive system. Thus, there is a necessity for the court to
be familiar with all rules of procedure in order to apply any one of them
properly. A statute of limitation is not a part of normal rules of procedure and could be individually translated without losing any of the
basic substance of the enactment. Although the substance-procedure
rationale may be justified on the basis of convenience of application in
many areas of the law, it is an artificial and misleading concept regarding
statutes of limitation. Simply stated, "A 'right' is not something which
has an objective existence independent of a 'remedy' [but rather] . . . it
exists in a particular country only if ... the courts ... of that country
will enforce it and give a remedy for its breach."'
The most far reaching exception to the general rule that the forum
statute of limitation controls, thereby being characterized as procedural,
is the borrowing statutes enacted in most of the fifty states. Generally,
the purpose of such statutes is to bar the action if it is barred by the
place of the otherwise applicable law." Despite application of these
See also A.

DE CERVERA, THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN AMERICAN

CONFLICTS OF

LAws 3 (1966); Hogget v. Emerson, 8 Kan. 262 (1871).
113 J. BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935).
13 See Vernon, Statute of Limitations in the Conflict of Laws, 32 RocKY MT. L. Rnv.
287, 293 (1960).
140. HOLMES, COLLECTED LErAL PAPERS 167 (1920).
"'J. FALCONBRIDGE, CONFLICT OF LAWS S 241.43 (1947).
"'See, e.g., TEx. REv. Crr. STAT. ANN. art 4678 (1952) which allows the maintenance of a wrongful death suit in Texas so long as it is not barred by the law of the
place of the injury; Texas still follows the traditional place of the injury rule, Marmon
v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968). See generally Thomas,
Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law 23 Sw. L. J. 159 (1969).
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statutes, there will, of necessity, be widely varying results.' Moreover, a
state may apply its own statute of limitation, consistent with the full
faith and credit clause of the Constitution, and deny enforcement to a
cause of action barred at the forum but not barred at the place of the
otherwise applicable law." Thus, the goal of conflict of laws-substantial
identity of result-is thwarted by allowing the forum to apply its own
limitation period to a foreign cause of action.
The harshness of the lex tori rule has also been relaxed by judicial
exceptions to the usual procedural characterization of statutes of limitation. Such statutes are characterized as substantive on the basis of four
possible tests, which are by no means clearly defined. The "built-in test"
was first announced in The Harrisburg."The case involved a suit in rem,
brought in admiralty to recover damages from the steamer Harrisburg
for the death of a seaman. The Supreme Court held that a wrongful
death action was unknown to the common law and thus no recovery was
possible unless predicted on state wrongful death acts. Each of the acts
involved provided a one-year statute of limitation. The Court construed the limitation as one upon the right and not merely the remedy.
As Mr. Justice Holmes conceived it:
The statute creates a new legal liability, with the right to a suit for its
enforcement, provided the suit is brought within the twelve months, and
not otherwise. The time within which the suit must be brought operates
as a limitation of the liability itself as created, and not of the remedy
alone. It is a condition attached to the right to sue at all ....

Time has

been made the essence of the right, and the right is lost if the time is disregarded. The liability and the remedy are created by the same statutes,
and the limitations of the remedy are, therefore, to be treated as limitations of the right."
" Compare Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968)

(most significant con-

tacts) with Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W. 2d 182 (Tex. 1968) (place
of the injury). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 145
(Prop. Off. Draft, Pt. 1, 1968).
"sWells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953). An action was brought
for the wrongful death of an Alabama citizen against a Pennsylvania Corporation.
Pennsylvania had a one-year statute of limitations on wrongful death actions and
Alabama had a two-year limitation period. Trial was to a Pennsylvania court and
the United States Supreme Court affirmed a summary judgment for the defendant
on the ground that the cause of action was barred by the forum statute of limitations.
The court found no compulsion under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to apply the
foreign statute of limitations.
The court had difficulty distinguishing the earlier case of Hughes v. Fetter, 341
U.S. 609 (1951) which had required Wisconsin to open her doors to the enforcement
of a wrongful death claim based on Illinois' law. Mr. Cheif Justice Vinson found the
differentiating factor to be the "uneven hand" Wisconsin had laid on causes of action
arising in sister states. A close reading of Hughes will disclose that that was not the
basis of Mr. Justice Black's opinion, and in fact it seems to be clearly contra to it.
19119 U.S. 199 (1886).
'Id. at 214. (emphasis added). As to whether a right existed under federal
admiralty law prior to the enactment of wrongful death statutes, see Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), noted in, 36 J. Am L. & COM. 745 (1970).
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Therefore, if under the "built-in test" the foreign statute of limitation
can be construed as barring the right as well as the remedy, the foreign
statute will control. 1 Generally, an equitable result is reached, but such
is due to happenstance rather than careful judicial reasoning.
The second test, variously called the "directed test" or the "specificity
test," was first enunciated in Davis v. Mills.22 A suit was filed in Connecticut against corporate directors pursuant to a Montana statute. Mr.
Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court once again, stated:
[T]he fact that the limitation is contained in the same section or the
same statute is material only as bearing on construction. It is merely a
ground for saying that the limitation goes to the right created, and accompanies the obligation everywhere. The same conclusion would be
reached if the limitation was in a different statute, provided it was directed to the newly created liability so specifically as to warrant saying
2
that it qualified the right."

This is by far the most widely accepted test for determining whether a
statute of limitation is substantive."4 The courts in some instances have
gone so far as to allow an action, barred at the forum, to be commenced
on the theory that a statute creating a new liability must be applied in
toto by the forum state. In such a case, an action at the forum will be
barred only if barred by the law of the place having the otherwise applicable law.2"
The third test is the "foreign courts' characterization test." Under this
test the forum will determine whether the particular statute of limitation
is substantive or procedural by characterizing it as the courts of the
foreign jurisdiction have characterized it."e In Goodwin v. Townsend"
recovery was sought in a federal district court in Pennsylvania under
the Ontario Highway Traffic Act. The plaintiffs' injuries resulted from
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 143 (Prop. Off. Draft Pt. I,
1968). See also Gaston v. B. F. Walker, Inc., 400 F. 2d 671 (5th Cir. 1968); State of
California v. Copus, 158 Tex. 196, 309 S.W. 2d 227, cert. denied, 356 U.S. (1958);
Hamilton v. Cooper, I Miss. 542 (1832).
22 194 U.S. 451 (1904).

11d. at 454. (emphasis added).

4

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 143 comment c (Prop. Off.
Draft Pt. 1, 1968).
21 Theroux v. Northern Pacific R.R., 64 F. 2d 84 (8th Cir. 1894). See also Maki

v. George R. Cooke Co., 124 F. 2d 663 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 686

(1942); Norman v. Baldwin, 152 Va. 800, 148 S.E. 831 (1929).
Contra, Platt v. Wilmot, 193 U.S. 602 (1904); Dainan v. A. J. Lindemann & Hover-

son Co., 238 F. 2d 72 (7th Cir. 1956); Tiffenbrun v. Flannery, 198 N.C. 397, 161

S.E. 857 (1930). The "specificity" test is the test the plaintiffs in Ramsay contended
should have been applied by the Fifth Circuit. Plaintiff-Allellants' Petition for Re-

hearing or Rehearing En Banc, Docket No. 28266, pp. 4-5, Ramsay v. Boeing Co.,

432 F. 2d 592 (5th Cir. 1970).
26 RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF CONFLICT OF LAws

Draft Pt. I, 1968).
.27 197 F. 2d 970 (3d Cir. 1952).

§ 143 comments b, c (Prop. Off.
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an automobile accident in Ontario, Canada, more than twelve months
prior to the filing of the suit. Under the Ontario Act, suit must be brought
within twelve months of the date of the accident or the action is barred. 8
The Third Circuit, in determining whether the limitation was procedural
or substantive, looked to the characterization given the statute by the
Ontario courts. This particular test has not been widely accepted, but
the courts of New York" and Maryland,' in addition to the Third Circuit, appear to have adopted this view.
The final standard for determining whether a statute should be characterized as substantive or procedural has been denominated the "attributes test." The court must determine whether the statute possesses
attributes under the law of the foreign state which the forum would
characterize as substantive. The only case applying this test is Wood
& Selick, Inc. v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique." In that case suit
was instituted under the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal court in
New York on bills of lading issued in France. The district court characterized the French statute as procedural and held that the longer New
York statute would permit the action. Speaking for the Second Circuit,
Judge Learned Hand stated:
Our own statutes of limitation do in fact extinguish the right so far as
they extinguish all remedies, for a right without a remedy is a meaningless scholasticisim, and the distinction we make is more than formal
only in that the applicable period varies with the law of the forum where
the suit chances to be laid. At any rate it is permissible for us to say that
if the assumed extinguishment which the French law imposes, is itself
subject to conditions which assimilate it to our ordinary statutes of
limitation, it makes no difference that it speaks of 'extinguishment.' We
are to decide whether the defense falls within one class or the other
recognized by us, and in that inquiry we are not necessarily concluded
by the terms used; we may assimilate it rather to matter of remedy, just
because it has those conditions which would so determine it in our law."
Under this test, a forum court looks to the law of the foreign jurisdiction
and attempts to determine the characteristics of the statute under the
foreign law which the forum characterizes as either substantive or procedural. Until Ramsay no other court attempted to apply the attributes
test; the Second Circuit later reversed itself on the point." These tests,
although consciously designed to relieve against the harshness of the
8Id. at 973.
29Schwertreger v. Scandanavian Am. Lines, 186 App. Div. 89, 174 N.Y.S. 147
(1st Dept.) aff'd without opinion, 226 N.Y. 676, 123 N.E. 888 (1919). See also
Carpenter v. Kice, 270 F. Supp. 432 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
30 Leonard v. Wharton, 268 F. Supp. 715 (D.Md. 1967).
3143 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1930).
31Id. at 943 (emphasis added).
33Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955).
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lex fori rule, unfortunately provide little in the way of certainty or pre-

dictability in the area of conflicts of law.
The above tests apply to all types of statutes of limitation but are
particularly significant where wrongful death statutes are involved.
Wrongful death statutes of limitation are most often considered sub-

stantive" because passed in derogation of the common law.' Such statutes either allow a cause of action where none previously existed or
prevent a cause of action from abating on the death of the injured party.

Whether the fact that the statute alters the common law is a valid ground
for treating its limitation period differently is questionable, such is the
rule in a vast majority of American jurisdictions.'
It is apparent that when a foreign statute of limitation is involved,
the adjudication of the controversy doubles in complexity. When the
foreign law is not that of another state, but that of a civil law nation
with no historical common law background, the problems are almost
insurmountable.
The Fifth Circuit in Ramsay relied heavily on three prior Mississippi
cases and two recent Fifth Circuit cases in concluding that the Belgian

statute of limitation was substantive and thus would bar an action in
Mississippi.' These cases are clearly distinguishable since they involved
" Other examples are land, Alies, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws,
39 MICH. L. REv. 392 (1941); Winburn v. Cockran, 9 Tex. 123 (1852); and actions
under the Federal Employers Liability Act, Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Burnette, 293
U.S. 199 (1915).
31 R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW S 139 (1968). In addition Professor Ehrenzweig contends that such statutes have been so generally adopted that they can be
legitimately considered to be a type of "statutory common law." A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 552 (1962).
36Parker v. Fies & Sons, 243 Ala. 348, 10 So.2d 13 (1942); Wohlgemuth v. Meyer,
139 Cal. App. 2d 326, 293 P.2d 816 (1956); Baker v. Baningoso, 134 Conn. 382, 58
A.2d 5 (1948); Pack v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 11 Del. 413, 132 A.2d 54 (1957); Country Mutual Ins. Co. v. National Bank of Decatur, 109 Ill. App. 2d 133, 248 N.E.2d
299 (1969); Harwood v. Chicago R.I. & P. Ry., 101 Kan. 215, 171 P. 354 (1917); Succession of Roux v. Guidry, 182 So.2d 109, error ref., 248 La. 1106, 184 So.2d 27
(1966); State v. Cobourn, 171 Md. 23, 187 A. 881 (Ct. App. 1936); Sterling v. Frederick
Leyland & Co., 242 Mass. 8, 136 N.E. 60 (1922); Berghuis v. Korthuis, 228 Minn. 534,
37 N.W,2d 809 (1949); Monsour v. Farris, 181 Miss. 803, 181 So. 326 (1938); Baysinger v. Hanser, 355 Mo. 1042, 199 S.W.2d 644 (1947); Peters v. Public Service Corp.,
132 N.J. Eq. 500, 29 A.2d 189 (1942); Wall v. Gillet, 61 N.M. 256, 298 P.2d 939
(1956); McDonough v. Cestare, 3 App. Div. 2d 201, 159 N.Y.S.2d 616, appeal denied,
3 App. Div. 2d 861, 163 N.Y.S.2d 376 (2d Dept., 1957); Graves v. Welborn, 260 N.C.
688, 133 S.E.2d 761 (1963); Klema v. St. Elizabeth's Hospital, 170 Ohio 519, 166
N.E.2d 765 (1960); Brookshire v. Burkhart, 141 Okla. 1, 283 P. 571 (1930); Richard
v. Slate, 239 Ore. 164, 396 P.2d 900 (1964); Tillinghast v. Reed, 70 R.I. 259, 38 A.2d
782 (1944); State of California v. Copus, 158 Tex. 196, 309 S.W.2d 227, cert. denied,
356 U.S. 967 (1958); Seely v. Cowley, 12 Utah 2d 252, 365 P.2d 63 (1961); Dowell v.
Cox, 108 Va. 460, 62 S.E. 272 (1908); Lambert v. Ensign Mfg. Co., 42 W. Va. 813,
26 S.E. 431 (1896).
7Gaston v. B.F. Walker, Inc., 400 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1968); Ford, Bacon & Davis
v. Valentine, 64 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1933); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Payne, 183 So. 2d
912 (Miss. 1966); Davis v. Meridian & B. R.R., 248 Miss. 707, 161 So. 2d 171 (1964);
Hamilton v. Cooper, 1 Miss. 542 (1832).
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the application of common law statutes of sister states. Further, none of
the cases applied the attributes test.
The most recent Mississippi case, Bethlehem Steel Company v.
Payne,8 is typical of the factual settings and legal analysis of the other
cases."9 In that case suit was instituted in Mississippi under the Louisiana
Compensation Act for personal injuries while in the course and scope
of employment. The Mississippi court held:
[W]here a statute which creates the right, in the same enactment provides for the time within which suit is to be brought . . . a majority of
the courts have taken the position that the limitation qualifies the right
so that unless suit is brought within the time allowed under the foreign
statute, no suit may be brought at the forum, even though the time may
be longer."0
Each of the cases cited by Judge Morgan involved statutes with built-in
prescription periods."' It is difficult to believe that even the Fifth Circuit
could construe any one of these cases to support the position taken in
Ramsay.
The Fifth Circuit in Ramsay made a clear break with the totality of
the courts in the American system. No other jurisdiction has adopted
the attributes test. The only court which ever applied that test has long
since overruled the holding.' Judge Morgan cited only one reason for
failing to apply the test of Davis v. Mills: it "lacks the clarity necessary
for facile application. '' " Instead, he concluded that "a more satisfactory
approach in this situation is to determine whether the Belgian prescrip8 183 So. 2d 912 (Miss. 1966).
8 This statement is not categorically true as to Davis v. Meridian & B. R.R.,
248 Miss. 707, 161 So. 2d 171 (1964). In Davis the Mississippi court was
faced with the problem of construing the Alabama wrongful death statute.
A foreign administrator brought suit in Mississippi without qualifying
under the Mississippi law. After notice of this, he subsequently qualified
in Mississippi but the time for bringing the wrongful action had run under
the Alabama statute. The Mississippi court held: "Our courts adopt the
construction of a statute given by the courts of the state whose legislature
enacted it." Id. at 172. This particular statement would seem to be based
on the "foreign courts' characterization test" rather than on the built-in
test present in the other four cases.
40
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Payne, 183 So. 2d 912, 916 (Miss. 1966). See also G.
STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws, § 148 (3d ed. 1963) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 143 (Prop. Off. Draft Pt. I, 1968).
41Gaston v. B.F. Walker, Inc., 400 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1968) and Ford, Bacon &
Davis v. Valentine, 64 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1933), involve the application of the Louisiana
Compensation Act, as did the Bethlehem Steel Company case. The prescription period
in each of these cases was built-in to the statutory enactment by the Louisiana Legislature. In the ancient Hamilton case the Kentucky statute regulating detinue actions on
runaway slaves contained a built-in prescription period also. It is impossible to conclude
from the above cases that any similarity exists between them and Ramsay except to the
extent that the ultimate result was that all of the statutes were characterized as substantive.
4' Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955).
4' Ramsay v. Boeing Co., 432 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1970).
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tion statute has attributes under Belgian law which Mississippi would
characterize as substantive."" The casual logic of the court compels
belief in its stated criteria, but under careful analysis it appears the court
is stepping from "muddy ground" into a hopeless quagmire of foreign
law.
It is apparent that under the "built-in test" the Belgian limitation
statute would not bar the suit. The limitation is not in the same statute,
and it is not even in the same code or type of code. A more compelling
showing should be necessary to allow a criminal statute of limitation to
bar a civil remedy where the difference in the limitation periods is twentyfive years.' Under the "specificity test" it would again be difficult to argue
that a criminal statute was directed at the right created in the civil code
so specifically as to say that it qualified it. Here, however, despite the
fact that Judge Morgan purports to apply the "attributes test," he seems
intent on showing how specifically the penal limitation is directed at the
civil cause of action.' Such discussion is hardly relevant to the test purportedly applied by the court. The "foreign courts' construction test"
also presents formidable difficulties in its application to the present case.
A civil law country rarely finds it necessary to construe its laws in such
a way as to make that construction useful to a common law court in
determining whether a statute is substantive or procedural. It is virtually
impossible to tell from the record whether the Belgian courts had construed this statute in any way, notwithstanding any consideration regarding a procedural-substantive classification. In such a situation the
court is at best guessing, and where foreign nation law is involved, adversary experts replace the court as the final "guessers."
Under the court's own test, however, there does not appear to be any
significant showing that any "attributes" were found. The opinion seems
intent on showing how the Belgian courts had construed the statute or
on showing that the penal prescription period was specifically directed
at the civil cause of action. Apparently, the court is not interested in applying its own test, but would rather use the more established means of
reaching a final conclusion. The case is an anachronism in the Fifth Circuit, the courts of Mississippi and, even more objectionably, within itself.
Some justifications may be offered for the court's unique decision. As
Judge Morgan points out, this suit was filed approximately thirteen days
before Mississippi's statute of limitation would have prescribed the action." The action had already been prescribed under the limitations
periods of all other states having any contact with the accident or the
" Id.
at 600, nn.12-14.
at 599-603.
41Id. at 594.

4Id.

4"Id.
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parties. 8 Further, the only contact Mississippi had with the suit was that
Boeing Company did business there and was amenable to service of
process. Mississippi is also the only state with a six-year limitation period
on wrongful death actions. On these facts, the Fifth Circuit was faced
with one of the most blatant cases of forum shopping since the abolition
of the "general federal common law."' The court could not dismiss the
action on the grounds of forum non conveniens," for there was no other
available forum. Applying the built-in or specificity tests, it is unlikely
that Belgian law could be construed as barring the claim. Therefore, the
court was left with the "attributes" or foreign courts' characterization
test. It seems apparent that the court selected the least defensible of the
two. However, in light of the difference of interpretation given a statute
by a civil law country as opposed to that of a common law country,
neither test would definitely control the disposition of the case. The
court chose to follow a unique and questionable test and stretched it to
its logical breaking point. The gross nature of the forum shopping apparently was the deciding factor. In a less blatant case the court would
have followed traditional reasoning and applied one of the two major
tests in construing the statute.
The test applied by the Fifth Circuit is by no means a picture of clarity
and logic in comparison to the built-in or specificity tests. As one court,
speaking of the specificity test, stated:
It is true that the test we prefer leaves much to be desired. It permits
the existence of a substantial gray area between the black and white. But
it at least furnishes a practical means of mitigating what is at best an
artificial rule in the conflict of laws, without exposing us to the pitfalls
inherent in prolonged excursions into foreign law ... "
The Ramsay court's test requires too great a reliance on foreign experts
who are required to testify in a foreign language through interpreters; in
doing so they must attempt to mesh two systems which are inherently
Id. at 594, n.4.
4 The most blatant case of forum shopping remains Black & White Taxicab Co. v.
Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928). In that case a Kentucky corporation had an exclusive taxi service contract in Kentucky and sought to enjoin another
Kentucky corporation from violating this monopoly type agreement. Under Kentucky
law such a contract was unenforceable, but under the "general federal common law" of
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), such an agreement was enforceable. The
plaintiffs dissolved the Kentucky corporation, reincorporated it in Tennessee, and then
sued in federal court. They were thus able to have the favorable federal law applied on
the basis of diversity of citizenship and careful forum selection. See also Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) and Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
For a general discussion of the problem see C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 54-55
(2d ed. 1970); 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 8, 138
(Wright ed. 1963).
" See H. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11 (4th ed. 1964); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) and Note, 36 J. AIR L. & COM. 759 (1970).
11Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955).
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different under conditions which lead to mistakes and misstatements. If
the real basis of the traditional procedural characterization is ease of
administration, the excerpts printed from the testimony of the experts
in the present case make it obvious that such determination takes much
longer than a simple translation of the applicable statute. 2
It would be much less confusing and time-consuming to treat all
statutes of limitation as substantive. It is much more convenient to translate a two or three line statute than to attempt to characterize it after
translation. Such an approach would eliminate the necessity for prolonged "excursions into foreign law" and would provide the much needed
certainty that is presently lacking in conflict of laws. It would also alleviate some of the problems noted above regarding borrowing statutes
and a longer forum statute of limitation. Here the limitation period of
the state having the otherwise applicable law would apply. There would
still be differences in result due to the various methods used in determining the applicable law, but any increase in consistency would be
welcomed. This is not, however, the approach taken by the overwhelming majority of common law courts, although there is authority for such
a view in many civil law countries." This simplified approach may at
least serve to bring some semblance of order out of utter chaos. The
present system is cumbersome and highly unworkable. It is time to heed
Mr. Justice Holmes' admonition. Only justice and convenience of administration can result from such a course of action. As to Ramsay,
Judge Morgan has probably unconsciously offered the most relevant
evaluation of the case; the attributes test "lacks the clarity necessary for
facile application."
William Frank Carroll

PRODUCTS LIABILITY-IMPLIED WARRANTY-Section 2-315 Of
The Uniform Commercial Code Is Extended To Lease Transactions.
W. E. Johnson Equipment Co. v. United Airlines, Inc., 238 So. 2d 98
(Fla. 1970).
United Airlines leased a forklift hoist from W. E. Johnson Equipment Company for the purpose of loading and unloading wheelchair
passengers to and from its planes at the Miami airport. The hoist malfunctioned, causing a passenger to fall to the ground and sustain serious
personal injuries. After settling the passenger's claim, United sought
indemnification from Johnson in a Florida state court on the ground
.2

Ramsay v. Boeing Co., 432 F.2d 592, 601-03 (5th Cir. 1970).

-s See Lorenzen, Statutes of Limitation and the Conflict of Laws, 28 YALE L.J. 492
(1919); Johnson v. Continental Southern Lines, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 809 (D. Ark. 1959).
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of breach of implied warranty of fitness. The trial court granted Johnson's motion for a directed verdict on the ground that the suit was improper. The appellate court reversed.' Held, affirmed: In the absence of
an agreement to the contrary, where the lessor has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the leased chattel is required and that the
lessee is relying on the skill and judgment of the lessor to select or furnish
a suitable chattel, there is an implied warranty that the chattel is fit for
that purpose. W. E. Johnson Equipment Co. v. United Airlines, Inc.,
238 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1970).
In deciding that the duty of a bailor for hire was not limited to the
exercise of due care to furnish an article in a reasonably safe condition,'
the court extended the implied warranty of fitness under section 2-315
of the Uniform Commercial Code to the bailment for hire or lease situation.' A source of difficulty in the developing area of products liability
has been the conflict between strict liability in tort, as stated in section
402A of the Restatement," and the warranty theory, as provided in sections 2-313 through 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code.' It is uncertain whether section 402A, based on the common law, is consistant
with or complementary to the statutory rules of the UCC. Some authorities contend that the conflict is merely semantic, since the same persons
are provided the same remedy based on essentially the same criteria;
others, supporting the Restatement position, contend that the UCC is
more limited in the relief granted as well as the persons protected and,
therefore, is inadequate to afford the needed protection.! Although
Johnson deals specifically with the extension of the implied warranty of
fitness to lease situations, the method of interpretation and application
of the Code used by the court has significance in resolving the conflict
between the Code and Section 402A.
1

United Airlines, Inc. v. W.E. Johnson Equip. Co., 227 So.2d 528 (Fla. App. 1969).

The appellate court noted that its decision was in apparent conflict with Brookshire v. Florida Bendix Co., 153 So.2d 55 (Fla. App. 1963) in which the court had
previously stated that the duty of the lessor was limited to the exercise of due care.
' See Bankoff, Implied Warranties of Quality: Protection in Chattel Leases, 11 LAw
FORUM 115 (1969); Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57
COLUM. L. REV. 653 (1957); Krasnow, The Extension of Warranty Protection to Lease
Transactions, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 127 (1968); 8 AM. JUm. 2d Bailments §
143-55 (1963); Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 850 (1959).
4

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 402A (1965).

§§ 2-313 to 2-318.
6See Littlefield, Some Thoughts on Product Liability Law: A Reply to Professor
Shanker, 18 W. RES. L. REv. 10 (1966); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966); Rapson, Products Liability Under
Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 692 (1965); Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Commentary on Jurisprudential
Eclipses, Pigeonholes, and Communication Barriers, 17 W. RES. L. REV. 5 (1965);
Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial Code,
5 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

22

STAN.

L.

REV.

713 (1970).
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Three basic approaches have been used by the courts in applying the

implied warranty provisions of the UCC to non-sale transactions. The
first is the sale-no sale distinction. Under this approach, the court merely
determines whether the transaction is a sale as defined by the Code.'
The Code afforded protection only in pure sale situations.' This approach

has been criticized as an opaque screen for the more relevant issues of
products liability and, consequently, there is some tendency to no longer
use it.'
The second approach bypasses the sale-no sale problem by examining
the facts of the transaction and determining whether the transaction

amounts to a sale in the form of a lease, such as aoform of security arrangement."0 This concept was enunciated in Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing

Corp." when the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that section 2-316 of
the UCC would be applied when the "provisions of the lease are analogous to a sale."" However, as the dissent pointed out, the majority
gave no guidelines to aid in the determination of when this situation
exists. 3 Thus, rather than clarifying the issue, the decision confused the
question and substituted terminology. The decision in Sawyer would have

been more significant had it unequivocally asserted that implied warranties should be extended to lease arrangements whenever circum-

stances justify their imposition. The specific details of the contract would
no longer be relevant factors considered. Rather, the court would look
to the underlying reasons for applying the warranty to leases."'
The court in Johnson, setting forth the third approach, examined the
circumstances surrounding the transaction to determine whether they
'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-106(1) defines a sale as a "passing of title from
the seller to the buyer."
'Some American courts have followed the English "essence" test for service-goods
contracts in determining whether the contract is a service or a sales contract for purposes of UCC protection. Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales
Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REV.. 653, 663-64 (1957). See, e.g., Lovett v. Emory University,
Inc., 116 Ga. 277, 156 S.E.2d 923 (Ga. App. 1967); Epstein v. Giannattasio, 25 Conn.
Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (C.P. 1963). But see Newmark v. Gimbels, Inc., 54 N.J. 585,
258 A.2d 697 (1969).
' Miller, A "Sale of Goods" as a Prerequisite for Warranty Protection, 24 Bus.
LAWYER 847, 854-55 (1969). The sale-no sale distinction is not dead as a sale was held
to be required in a strict liability in tort case Freitas v. Twin City Fisherman's Cooperative, 452 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
oSee, e.g., General Electric Credit Corp. v. Bankers Commercial Corp., 244 Ark.
984, 429 S.W.2d 60 (1968); Associates Discount Corp. v. Palmer, 47 N.J. 183, 219
A.2d 858 (1966); Asco Mining Co. v. Gross Contracting Co., 3 U.C.C. Rptr. 293 (Pa.
C.P. 1965); Carlo Bianchi & Co. v. Builder's Equip. & Supply Co., 347 Mass. 636, 199
N.E.2d 519 (1964).
" 244 Ark. 943, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968).
"1Id. at 54 (emphasis added).
11Id. at 56 (dissenting opinion).
4
Krasnow, The Extension of Warranty Protection to Lease Transactions, 10 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REV. 127, 138 (1968).
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are appropriate to imply a warranty of fitness and gave guidelines to aid
in that determination. This method is preferrable because it deals with
the real issue of products liability-consumer protection.
The opinion begins by noting that Official Comment 2 of section 2-313
expressly states that the warranty provisions of the UCC are not limited
exclusively to sales, but may be applied in other "appropriate circumstances such as bailments for hire."'" This conclusion is proper not only
for reasons of policy, but is also supported by section 2-102 which defines the scope of article 2 of the Code in terms of "transactions in
goods" which clearly is not limited to sales."6 In addition, section 1-102
encourages the evolutionary expansion of the Code by calling for a
liberal construction to promote its underlying purposes and policies."'
Thus, support for the extension of the implied warranty provision to
lease transactions is found within the UCC itself.
The court not only defined the scope of the statute, but also outlined
the reasons for imposing a warranty of fitness and described the "appropriate circumstances" when the imposition was proper. The court
confronted the essential purposes and the public policy involved in implying warranties to protect the consumer in sales transactions and
found by analogy that the same elements were present in a lease situation.
This is the same method used in Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing and
Rental Service" and Price v. Shell Oil Co." to extend strict liability in

tort under section 402A to lease situations.
The court in Cintrone discussed both strict liability in tort and implied warranty, but it is unclear which was used as the basis for the
decision. The court held that the trial judge should have submitted the
issue of breach of warranty to the jury, but notes parenthetically that an
action in strict liability, although not plead by the plaintiff, would be
considered more apt." However, the complaint was not based on the
UCC and the apparent consensous of the commentators is that Cintrone
was decided on common law principles of strict liability and breach of
warranty and, therefore, cannot be cited as a Code case although the
rationale of the court is consistant with Code principles." As the original
warranties in sales transactions were created by the common law, it is
not surprising that the common law could extend those warranties to
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 2-313, comment 2.

COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-102. See Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v.
Transportation Credit, 59 Misc. 2d 226, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392 (N.Y. County Ct. 1969).
"7UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102.
"sUNIFORM

s45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
"92 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970).
"0Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing and Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769,

781 (1965).
11Krasnow, The Extension of Warranty Protection to Lease Transactions, 10 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REV. 127, 135 (1968).
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lease transactions using the policies of the Code, as expressed in the

comments, for guidance."
The courts following Cintrone view it as deciding with reference to the
doctrine of strict liability in tort. In Price, the court stated that Cintrone

held "that a lessor of a truck is liable upon the basis of strict liability in
tort."

Thus, Cintrone must be distinguished from Johnson which was

based on the statutory provisions of the UCC and not on common law
principles of implied warranty.
The basic elements cited in Cintrone and Price to justify the extension
to leases are essentially the same elements cited in Johnson. The leasing

industry has greatly expanded in recent years and the same business
goals may be obtained through leases as well as sales.2 The risk of harm
from a defective product exists in lease situations just as in sales. The
person leasing a product is in equal need, and has an equal right to,
protection from an unreasonable risk of harm. The lessee, like the
buyer, is relying on the skill and judgment of the lessor to provide a safe

product. In fact, the reliance in a lease situation is greater in that there
is less opportunity to examine and inspect the product for defects."
Finding these elements present in a lease situation, the court in Johnson

held that the implied warranty of fitness of purpose should be applied.
The ability of the lessor to bear and distribute the loss as the person
putting the product in the stream of commerce is the essential consideration in determining whether the warranty should be applied. This
21Miller, A "Sale of Goods" as a Prerequisite for Warranty Protection, 24 Bus.
LAWYER 847, 853 (1969).
11Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 772, 726, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970).
See also Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970); Stewart v. Budget Rent-aCar Corp., 470 P.2d 240 (Hawaii 1970). Katz v. Slade, 460 S.W.2d 608 (Mo. 1970)
held the extension under Cintrone applied only to "mass lessors" and did not include a
municipal facility. See note 27, infra. But see Speyer, Inc. v. Humble Oil and Refining
Co., 275 F. Supp. 861 (W.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 403 F.2d 766 (3d Cir. 1968).
24
W.E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, Inc., 238 So. 2d 98, 99 (Fla. 1970);
Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 726, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970);
Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing and Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769, 776
(1965).
See also L. VOLD, LAw OF SALES, § 4, at 11 (1931).
2
W.E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, Inc., 238 So. 2d 98, 100 (Fla. 1970);
Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 726, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970);
Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing and Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769, 777
(1965).
11W.E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, Inc., 238 So. 2d 98, 100 (Fla. 1970);
Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing and Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769, 778
(1965). "It is generally true that the bailee for hire spends less time shopping for the
article than he would in selecting like goods to be purchased, and since the item is not
one which he expects to own, he will usually be less competent in judging its quality."
Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REV.
653,2 673-74 (1957).
1The court in Johnson expressed the standard it would apply:
The warranty of fitness does not arise in all lease transactions, but it
should be recognized under appropriate circumstances. Just as in sales
cases, whether the warranty should be applied may depend upon whether
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approach allows a balancing of the interest of the consumer and the
interests of the lessor.2" On the one hand, the lessor engaged in the busi-

ness of renting goods is in the position to spread the loss resulting from
a defective product as an expense of doing business."9 He is also in the
position to know and control the condition of the chattel as well as

protect against loss through insurance." On the other hand, if the transaction is a single occurrence by a private individual who is not primarily
or substantially involved in leasing goods, the relative positions of the
parties would greatly change the court's considerations. 1

The similarity between the factors considered in Cintrone, Price and
Johnson justifying the extension of tort and warranty to leases is no accident. The underlying policy supporting the implied warranty of the UCC

is the same principle supporting section 402A. Both arise from a public
policy protecting the consumer from defective products placed on the
market. The warranty theory used in Johnson was expressed in Jacob
E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps,2 a pre-Code decision in which the
court stated:
We think the manufacturer is liable in this case under an implied warranty imposed by operation of law as a matter of public policy ...
Liability in such a case is not based on negligence, not on a breach of
the usual implied contract warranty, but on the broad principle of the
public policy to protect human health and life.
While a right of action in such a case is said to spring from a 'warranty,'
the lessor possessed or should have possessed expertise in the characteristics of the leased chattel, whether the lessee's reliance upon selection of
a suitable chattel was commercially reasonable, and whether the lessor
was a mass dealer in the chattel leased or whether the transaction was
an isolated occurrence.
238 So. 2d at 100.
In Conroy v. 10 Brewster Ave. Corp., 97 N.J. Super. 75, 212 A.2d 415, 418-19
(Super. Ct. 1967), it was held that the reasoning of Cintrone applied only to the "mass
lessor." The importance of the "commercial setting" is also emphasized in Price v.
Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 728, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970).
2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 2-104(1) provides:

'Merchant' means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by
his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill particular
to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such
knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or
other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having
such knowledge of skill.
The court's emphasis on the nature of the lessor's enterprise and ability to bear the
loss appears to be consistent with his definition.
29
W.E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, Inc., 238 So. 2d 98, 100 (Fla. 1970);
Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 726, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970);
Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing and Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769, 778
(1965).
oSee cases note 29 supra.
2 See note 28 supra.
32

139 Tex. 609, 612, 616-17, 164 S.W.2d 828, 829, 831-32 (1942).
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it should be noted that the warranty referred to is not the more modern
contractual warranty, but is an obligation imposed by law to protect
public health. . . and is not dependant on any provision of the contract,
either express or implied.
The above rationale and the reasoning of the court in Johnson should
be compared with the language found in comment c of section 402A:
On whatever theory, the justification for strict tort liability has been said
to be that the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption,
has undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward any member
of the consuming public who may be injured by it; that the public has
a right to and does expect in the case of products which it needs and for
which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand
behind their goods; that public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for the consumption be
placed upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be obtained; and that the
consumer of such products is entitled to the maximum protection at the
hands of someone, and the proper persons to afford it are those who
market the product."
Johnson approves of Prosser's conclusion that there is "no good reason
to withhold extension of the fitness warranty to the lease situation, subject to all limitations now found in sales cases." ' Cintrone reaches the
same conclusion: "In this developing area of the law we perceive no
sound reason why a distinction in principle should be made between the
sale of a truck by a manufacturer, and a lease for hire of the character
established by the evidence."" The similarity of these three decisions
continues in Price where the court, after citing the landmark decisions
of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.' and Vandermark v. Ford
Motor Co.," which established the basis of strict liability in tort, as well
as the extension to leases in Cintrone, concludes: "We can find no significant difference between a manufacturer or retailer who places an
article on the market by means of a sale and a bailor or lessor who accomplishes the same result by means of a lease."38
The present trend of judicial application of the Code implied warranties is apparently moving toward the position taken in section 402A.
Privity has been abolished in a number of states as a requirement of
recovery. 3 Disclaimer of liability has been held unenforceable if unconI RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §
(SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, comment m.

402A, comment c. See also

RESTATEMENT

238 So. 2d at 100, citing W. Prosser, Torts, 5 95, at 655 (3d ed. 1964).
35212 A.2d at 769.
a'59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
at61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
3' 466 P.2d at 727.

"For collection of cases see Anderson,
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scionable based on the bargaining positions of the parties and the interests involved."' Notice of injury has been less strictly applied in some
jurisdictions as a bar to recovery."1 The statute of limitations for torts,
running from the time of discovery of injury in most jurisdictions, could
be held to apply based on the recognition that implied warranty obligations rest in principles of public policy and not in a contract and as such
are not controlled by contractual limitations running from the time of
purchase.'
As the first case to extend the UCC to lease transactions, Johnson
should be of great significance as precedent for those jurisdictions which
apply the implied warranties of the UCC to products liability cases."
Johnson is indicative of the liberal approach taken by a growing number
of courts in affording protection to the consumer in such cases arising
under the Code. If the reasoning and the principles enunciated in Johnson are followed by other courts, regardless of the basis in tort or warranty, the needed protection would be afforded to the consumer and
public policy fulfilled, while the theorectical and semantic differences
would be left to the academicians.
R. Alan Haywood

FEDERAL PREEMPTION-SECURITY INTERESTS IN AIRCRAFTA Federally Recorded Security Interest Takes Priority Over The Interest Of A Buyer In Due Course. Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp.,
Inc., 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P. 2d 401 (1970), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W.
3162 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1971).
In October 1965 Nevadair, Inc., a Beecheraft distributor, delivered
a Beechcraft aircraft to Tanger, an authorized Beechcraft dealer, pursuant to a conditional sales contract. Under the contract, Nevadair
retained a security interest in the amount of the unpaid balance in the
aircraft; further, Tanger could not sell the plane without Nevadair's
consent. Nevadair then assigned its security interest to Beech Acceptance Corporation which filed the conditional sales contract and the
to 2-316 (2d Ed. 1970); Titus, supra note 6; Prosser, supra note 6; Annot., 74 A.L.R.
1111 (1960); Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 39 (1961); Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 1010 (1968).
40 Cases cited note 39 supra.
41Cases cited note 39 supra.

41Id. See also the dissenting opinion of Judge Breitel inMendel v.Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 346, 253 N.E.2d 207, 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490, 495 (1969).

3 Other courts have held other sections of the UCC applicable to leases. See Sawyer
v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 428 S.W.2d 46 (Ark. 1968); Hertz Commercial Leasing
Corp. v.Transportation Credit, 59 Misc. 2d 226, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392 (N.Y.County Ct.
1969).
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assignment with the Federal Aviation Agency These instruments were
recorded in November 1965. In July 1966 Dowell purchased the plane
from Tanger's dealership in the ordinary course of business, making
no inquiry into the state of the title since the plane was ostensibly new,
and Tanger was an authorized dealer. Neither Tanger nor Dowell
filed the bill of sale with the Federal Aviation Administration registry
as required by federal statute! When Beech and Nevadair learned that
the plane had been sold in violation of the conditional sales contract,
they removed the plane from Dowell's possession without his knowledge.
Upon discovering the loss, Dowell sued to establish title to the plane
and to recover damages from Beech, Nevadair, and Larson (Nevadair's
parent corporation). A judgment for Dowell was affirmed by a California appellate court." Held, reversed: The holder of a prior recorded
security interest in a new aircraft prevails over a subsequent buyer in the
ordinary course of business who did not record his title or search the FAA
registry to discover the existence of a prior security holder. The federal
policy requiring recordation of aircraft would be undermined if state
law regarding security interests controlled the rights of the parties.
Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal. 3d. 544, 476 P.2d 401
(1970), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3162 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1971).
The court concluded that it was faced with a direct conflict between
the Federal Aviation Act and the California Commercial Code.' The
Federal Aviation Act establishes a registry of all conveyances affecting
title to, or interest in, any civil aircraft in the United States; any conveyance not recorded is invalid, but a conveyance properly recorded
"shall from the time of its filing for recordation be valid as to all persons without further . . . recordation."' The court held that this secU.S.C. § 1403 (1964).
Id.; Tanger, however, did indicate to Dowell that he would file pursuant to the
federal statute.
8 Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 84 Cal. Reptr. 654, rev'd, 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476
P.2d 401 (1970).
4
Compare 49 U.S.C. 5 1403 with CAL. COMM. CODE §5 2403, 9307 (West 1965).
549 U.S.C. § 1403(d) (1964). The entire section reads:
5 1403. Recordation of aircraft ownership.
(a) Establishment of recording system.
The administrator shall establish and maintain a system for the recording of each and all of the following:
(1) Any conveyance which affects the title to, or any interest in, any
civil aircraft of the United States;
(2) Any lease, and any mortgage, equipment trust, contract of conditional sale, or other instrument executed for security purposes, which
lease or other instrument affects the title to, or any interest in, any
specifically identified aircraft engine or engines of seven hundred and
fifty or more rated takeoff horsepower for each engine or the equivalent
of such horsepower, or any specifically identified aircraft propeller capable
of absorbing seven hundred and fifty or more rated takeoff shaft horsepower, and also any assignment or amendment thereof or supplement
thereto;
149
2
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tion provided that the recordation with the FAA of a valid security
interest in an aircraft would give the holder a valid property interest

in the plane until the interest is divested by a subsequent valid recordation that takes priority! The California Commercial Code provides

that a third party buyer of goods in the ordinary course of business
(3) Any lease, and any mortgage, equipment trust contract of conditional sale, or other instrument executed for security purposes, which
lease or other instrument affects the title to, or any interest in, any aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances maintained by or on behalf of an
air carrier certificated under § 1424(b) of this title for installation or use
in aircraft, aircraft engines, or propellers, or any spare parts maintained
by or on behalf of such an air carrier, which instrument need only
describe generally by types the engines, propellers, appliances, and spare
parts covered thereby and designate the location or locations thereof; and
also any assignment or amendment thereof or supplement thereto.
(b) Recording of releases, cancellations, discharges, or satisfactions.
The Administrator shall also record under the system provided for in
subsection (a) of this section any release, cancellation, discharge, or
satisfaction relating to any conveyance or other instrument recorded under
said system.
(c) Validity of conveyances or other instruments; filing.
No conveyance or instrument the recording of which is provided for
by subsection (a) of this section shall be valid in respect of such aircraft, aircraft engine or engines, propellers, appliances, or spare parts
against any person other than the person by whom the conveyance or
other instrument is made or given, his heir or devisee, or any person having
actual notice thereof, until such conveyance or other instrument is filed
for recordation in the office of the Administrator: Provided, That previous
recording of any conveyance or instrument with the Administrator of the
Civil Aeronautics Administration under the provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 shall have the same force and effect as though recorded as provided herein; and conveyances, the recording of which is
provided for by subsection (a) (1) of this section made on or before
August 21, 1938, and instruments, the recording of which is provided for
by subsections (a) (2) and (a) (3) of this section made on or before
June 19, 1948, shall not be subject to the provisions of this subsection.
(d) Effect of Recording.
Each conveyance or other instrument recorded by means of or under
the system provided for in subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall from
the time of its filing for recordation be valid as to all persons without
further or other recordation, except that an instrument recorded pursuant
to subsection (a) (3) of this section shall be effective only with respect
to those of such items which may from time to time be situated at the
designated locations and only while so situated: Provided, that an instrument recorded under subsection (a) (2) of this section shall not be
affected as to the engine or engines, or propeller or propellers, specifically
identified therein, by any instrument theretofore or thereafter recorded
pursuant to subsection (a) (3) of this section, Sections E, F, G, omitted.
(h) Previously unrecorded ownership of aircraft.
The person applying for the issuance or renewal of an airworthiness
certificate for an aircraft with respect to which there has been no recordation of ownership as provided in this section shall present with his application such information with respect to the ownership of the aircraft
as the Administrator shall deem necessary to show the persons who are
holders of property interests in such aircraft and the nature and extent of
such interests.
49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1964).
' Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 403 (1970),
cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3162 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1971).
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takes the goods "free of a security interest created by the seller even
though the buyer knows of its existence."' A "buyer in the ordinary
course of business" is defined as one who purchases goods without

notice of a third party interest from a seller in the business of selling
goods of that kind.8 Moreover, a buyer can acquire no better title
than his seller held, unless the goods have been entrusted by a third
party to a seller of the type of goods in question, in which case the
seller can transfer all rights of the entrustor to a buyer in the ordinary
course of business.!
Two approaches may be taken in determining whether state or federal
priorities should control."0 The first involves a narrow construction of
The section reads as follows:
§ 9307. Protection of Buyers of Goods.
(1) A buyer in ordinary course of business (subdivision (9) of section
1201) other than a person buying farm products from a person engaged
in farming operations takes free of a security interest created by his seller
even though the security interest is perfected and even though the buyer
knows of its existence.
CAL. COMM. CODE

§ 9307 (West 1965).

8The section reads as follows:
§ 1201(9). 'Buyer in ordinary course of business' means a person who
in good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation
of the ownership rights or security interest of a third party in the goods
buys in ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods of
that kind but does not include a pawn broker. 'Buying' may be for cash
or by exchange of other property or on secured or unsecured credit and
includes receiving goods or documents of title under a preexisting contract
for sale but does not include a transfer in bulk or as security for or in
total or partial satisfaction of a money debt.
CAL. COMM. CODE § 1201 (West 1965).
°The section reads as follows:
§ 2403. Power to Transfer; Good Faith
Purchase of Goods; 'Entrusting.'
(1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or
had power to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the interest purchased. A person with
voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser
for value. When goods have been delivered under a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though
(a) The transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or
(b) The delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored,
or

(c) It was agreed that the transaction was to be a 'cash sale,' or
(d) The delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous
under the criminal law.
(2) Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in
goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster
to a buyer in ordinary course of business.
(3) 'Entrusting' includes any delivery and any acquiescence in retention
of possession for the purpose of sale, obtaining offers to purchase, locating
a buyer, or the like, regardless of any condition expressed between the
parties to the delivery or acquiescence and regardless of whether the procurement of the entrusting or the possessor's disposition of the goods have
been such as to be larcenous under the criminal law.
CAL. COMM. CODE S 2403 (West 1965).
10 For discussion of conflicting authority, see 22 A.L.R. 3d 1270 (1968).
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the scope of the federal provision. Under this view, section 1307 would
affect only the recordation of those conveyances" of aircraft specifically
included in the act. State law would control the validity of the recorded
title and subsequent rights of third parties not required to record under
state law to overcome a recorded interest. The initial recordation of a
conveyance of an aircraft is required by federal statute; however, the
priority of later transactions which do not depend on recordation for
validity are determined by state law. These transactions can divest title.
Federal registration would have no effect on other methods of perfecting a security interest under state law." Indeed, Congress intended the
federal statute to establish a uniform system of recordation, not a system
of federal priorities for property interests. This approach would not
deny that Congress has the power to establish priorities under the Commerce Clause, rather it recognizes that Congress has not done so within
the confines of section 1403." Significant support can be found for a
narrow view of section 1403. The legislative history of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 is vague; however, the history of its predecessor,
the 1939 Act, indicates that Congress did not intend section 1403 to
nullify state law affecting priority of secured interests; rather the Act
was intended to establish a federal system of recordation to replace
the varied and confusing state statutes then in existence. " Additional
support for a narrow reading of section 1403 may be found in the
legislative history and subsequent enactment of section 1406 in 1964."
Section 1406 states:
The validity of any instrument of which is provided for by section
[1403] of this title shall be governed by the laws of the state . . . in
"Conveyance is defined as follows:
§ 1301. Definitions. As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires(17) 'Conveyance' means a bill of sale, mortgage, assignment of a
mortgage, or other instrument affecting title to, or interest in, property.
49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1964).
"1"Perfection" of a security interest is generally accomplished by taking such steps
as are necessary to give the holder of the interest priority. See generally Perfected
Instrument, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1296 (4th ed. 1951); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE §§ 9-302, 9-303 (official text 1962). The Code, however, establishes certain circumstances where even a perfected interest may be defeated. See note 7 supra.
"Scott, Liens in Aircraft: Priorities, 25 J. AIR LAw & COMM. 193 (1958); Note,
Federal Protection of Security Interests in Carriers'Mobil Equipment, 71 HARv. L. REv.
1506 (1958).
'1 For an excellent analysis of the legislative history of the provision see Dowell v.
Beech Acceptance Corp., 84 Cal. Reptr. 654, rev'd, 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P. 2d 401 (1970);
see also Hearings on H.R. 9738, Before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., at 405-07 (1938); S. REPT. No. 1661, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess. (1938); 83 CONG. REC. 7104 (1938).
"SHearings on H. R. 2522, Before Subcommittee on Transportation and Aeronautics of the Committee of Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.,
at 25-28 (1963).
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which such instrument is delivered, irrespective of the location or the
place of delivery of the property which is the subject of such instrument."6
The commentators have consistently taken the view that section 1403
is not a comprehensive statute establishing federal priorities in property
interests; instead, they view the section as establishing a single system
of notice through a national recordation system." In situations similar
to Dowell, several courts have held that the federal statute controlled
only those transactions which established their priority by means of
recordation and, except for recordation, state law establishing priorities was controlling.' 8
The California Supreme Court refused to adopt the reasoning of
the trial court and the appellate court. Under the California Commercial Code, Beech's secured interest would have become effective upon
recordation with the federal registry, but the subsequent purchase of
the aircraft by Dowell from Tanger in the ordinary course of business
would have given Dowell title to the plane under the state-established
priorities, regardless of whether he recorded. In holding that the state
law could not prevail, the court adopted a more expansive interpretation of section 1403. Under this broader interpretation of section 1403
the court concluded that the statute was intended to establish a federal
registry and, in addition, established federal priorities, making recordation the exclusive means of perfecting any property interest in an aircraft. Under the court's approach, the initial validity of the transaction
would be controlled by state law; however, the transaction would be
invalid until recorded in the federal registry, regardless of whether
recordation under state law was required to give it priority over a
recorded interest. Thus, although a person could obtain a semi-valid
interest in property, for example a purchaser in the ordinary course
of business of an airplane subject to a prior recorded interest, he could
perfect his interest only by filing his title in the federal registry,'" thereby
establishing the priority.
The approach taken by the California Supreme Court finds considerable support in various cases interpreting section 1403.2" Most of these
149

U.S.C. § 1406 (1964).

17GILMORE, SEcuRrrY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, §

13.5 at 426, 427 (1965);

Scott, Liens in Aircraft: Priorities,25 J. AIR LAw & COMM. 193 (1958).
'1 State Securities Co. v. Aviation Enterprises, Inc., 355 F.2d 225 (10th Cir. 1966)

(dictum); Northern Illinois Corp. v. Bishop Distributing Co., 284 F. Supp. 121 (W.D.
Mich. 1968); Texas National Bank of Housong v. Aufderheide, 237 F. Supp. 599
(E.D. Ark. 1965); Aircraft Investment Corp. v. Pessani & Reid Equip. Co., 205 F.
Supp. 80 (E.D. Mich. 1962); Southern Jersey v. National Bank of Secaucus, 108 N.J.

Super. 369, 261 A. 2d 399 (App. Div. 1970).
"gIn re Verterans' Air Express Co., 76 F. Supp. 684 (D.C.N.J. 1948).
0
2 Marsden v. Southern Flight Service, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 411 (M.D.N.C. 1964);
United States v. United Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 52 (D. Conn. 1948); Smith v.
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cases are based on the supposition that the federal policy embodied in
section 1403 would be undermined if this section were not regarded
as establishing a comprehensive system for determining priorities of
property interests in aircraft." These decisions take the position that
the federal government has completely occupied the field of aircraft
recordation, preempting state law and establishing the controlling law
in the area. 2 Under this analysis, no property interest in an aircraft
can have any validity over a prior recorded interest until properly recorded. State law determines the validity of the documents recorded;
however, federal law establishes ipso facto that prior to recordation, no
interest is valid.
Dowell represents an application of federally established priorities
supplanting state priorities. 2 The court noted that in the absence of
the federal statute, California law would have dictated that Dowell,
as a buyer in the ordinary course of business, would be accorded priority. However, in enacting section 1403, Congress had manifested a
federal policy establishing priorities regarding aircraft. In holding that
Beech, which had recorded its interest under the federal statute, had
the superior interest, the court stated explicitly:
The federal policy to foster recordation and to protect recorded interests is eviscerated by a rule which relies on state laws to protect the buyer
in the ordinary course of business even though he fails to undertake a
simple title search which would have readily revealed all encumberances.u
The conflict existing between various courts results from their conflicting interpretations of the policy encompassed by the section and
the lengths Congress intended to go in effectuating the policy. All
authorities agree that the section was intended to establish a national
Eastern Airmotive Corp., 99 N.J. Super. 340, 240 A. 2d 17 (1968), rev'd, 108 N.J.
Super. 368, 261 A. 2d 399 (App. Div. 1970); Crescent City Aviation, Inc. v. Beverly
Bank, 139 Ind. App. 669, 219 N.E. 2d 446 (1966); Continental Radio Co. v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 369 S.W. 2d 359 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); James Talcott,
Inc. v. Bank of Miami Beach, 143 So. 2d 657 (Fla. App. 1962); Dawson v. General
Discount Corp., 82 Ga. App. 29, 60 S.W.2d 653 (1950).
21 International Atlas Services, Inc. v. Twentieth Century Aircraft Co., 251 Cal. App.
2d 434 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 38 U.S. 1038 (1967). Pope v. National Aero Finance
Co., 236 Cal. App. 2d 722, 733-35 (App. Div. 1965).
2See note 21 supra.
2

3The court stated:
Our task is to determine whether the foregoing federal system of recording interests in aircraft affects priorities recognized by applicable state
law. The issue is squarely before us because, absent the federal recording
system and its possible impact on state law, there can be no doubt that
Tanger had the power to defeat Beech's security interest by a sale to a
buyer in the ordinary course of business and that plaintiff was such a buyer.
Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 403 (1970), cert.
denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3162 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1971).
24ld.

at 406.

1971]

RECENT DECISIONS

recordation system; however, whether Congress intended to supplant
state established priorities has not been uniformly answered.
Courts adopting the view that state priorities are superceded have
indicated that the federal interest is all pervasive. The federal interest
demands that all equitable considerations giving rise to concepts such
as the "bonafide purchaser for value without notice," the "buyer in
the ordinary course of business," and the "artisan mechanic lien" must
give way to a federal recordation policy. Such a demanding federal
interest is enunciated neither in the statute nor in its legislative history;
indeed, a contrary intent is indicated."
The argument often advanced for federal preemption of state interests-uniform law involving interests of national importance-is
untenable, since state law throughout the nation is already uniform
under the Uniform Commercial Code." Indeed, if section 1403 is interpreted as preempting state law, the law regarding security interests
in goods is made less consistent by establishing special priorities applying only to aircraft.
Priority of secured interest in property has historically been an area
of state interest. If Congress had intended to emasculate state law in
this area as Dowell indicates, Congress surely would have done so with
a more definite statement of that intent. Merely to whisk aside the
policy consideration motivating the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code to include protection for a buyer in the ordinary course of
business appears to be advocation of returning to a rule in which the
maintenance of records is more significant than the equities underlying the transaction which the records represent. As noted by the
California Appellate Court, "it would indeed be anomalous if by saying nothing whatever about priorities, Congress had intended to wipe
out all state laws which on consideration of equity and public policy
have created exceptions to the 'first in time, first in right' rule.""7
Guy W. Anderson, Jr.

2'See

note 17 supra.

I See generally ANDERSON'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, CODE LOCALIZER, (1968,
Supp. 1971); FARNSWORTH & HENWOLD, SUPPLEMENT FOR USE WITH COMMERCIAL

LAw 3, 4 (2 ed. 1968).
27 Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 84 Cal. Reptr. 654, rev'd, 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476
P.2d 401 (1970), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3162 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1971).

